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Abstract 
Dramatic changes in the information security risk landscape over several decades have not yet been matched by 
similar changes in organizational information security, which is still mainly based on a mindset that security is 
achieved through extensive preventive controls. As a result, maintenance cost of information security is increasing 
rapidly, but this increased expenditure has not really made an attack more difficult. The opposite seems to be true, 
information security attacks have become easier to perpetrate and appear more like information warfare tactics. At 
the same time, the damage caused by a successful attack has increased significantly and may sometimes become 
critical to an organization. In this paper an extremely asymmetric risk is evaluated where a strongly motivated 
attacker unleashes a prolonged attack on an organization with the aim to do maximum damage. It is suggested that 
the probability of such an attack is increasing. The reason why preventive controls are unlikely to ever be effective 
against such an attack is discussed as well and proposals are made towards more advanced strategies that aim to 
limit the damage when such an attack occurs. One crucial lesson to be learned for those organizations that are 
dependent on their information security, such as critical infrastructure organizations, is the need to deny motivated 
attackers access to any information about the success of their attack. Successful deception in this area is likely to 
significantly reduce any potential escalation of the incident. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades organizations have become more and more dependent on advanced information systems 
to improve their business performance. As a result, these organizations’ business continuity is increasingly relying 
on the security of their information technology and communication (ITC) infrastructure. Lately, organizations 
involved in critical infrastructure industries have also started to rely more on their ITC infrastructure to increase 
business performance. At the same time, the risk landscape for organizations that have to rely on more and more 
extensive and increasingly complex ITC infrastructures has changed dramatically as well. This paper suggests that 
organizational information security has been unable to keep up with these changes.  
Our experience based on extensive case study based investigations into different aspects of security management in 
over 30 Australian organizations (Ruighaver 2007, Dojkovski 2007, Shedden 2006, Koh 2005) is that the current 
mindset in information security has stayed relatively unchanged since the 1980’s. While recent security standards, 
such as ISO 27000 series (Humphreys 2005),  have introduced a life cycle approach to information security, there is 
still mainly an emphasis on the management of  individual risks through mainly preventive controls and there is a 
general lack of suggestions for a more strategic approach to information security.  
The dramatic change in the risk landscape over the past few decades, as mentioned above, is not limited to a single 
aspect of information risk. A risk is generally identified as a threat impacting on a vulnerability resulting in an 
impact. Since the 1980’s both the threat and vulnerability landscapes have evolved significantly, while the increased 
importance of information systems for organizations ensures that the potential impact of a security breach has 
become increasingly more damaging as well.  
The next section discusses these changes and then focuses on the growing importance of certain asymmetric risks. 
While the use of asymmetric tactics in information security attacks is not new, there will be discussion on how 
changes in the motivation behind certain attacks, as well as the potential enormous impact of these attacks, makes it 
crucial that organizations identify these potential asymmetric risks and plan how they can reduce the impact of any 
security incidents resulting from such asymmetric risks.  
The final section discusses why common incident response strategies may not be effective when these asymmetric 
risks eventuate and indicate potential research areas that need to be explored to generate new approaches to incident 
response.  
THE CHANGING RISK LANDSCAPE. 
The evolution of the risk landscape since the last century has not been limited to any single aspect of risk. This 
section discusses how there has been a significant increase in vulnerabilities as well as an increase in potential attack 
vectors - both crucial factors that increase the leverage of asymmetric tactics which will be discussed in the next 
section. Other changes in the risk landscape that have influenced the ascent of asymmetric risk, and will be 
discussed in this section, are a larger reliance on ITC infrastructure and the resulting increase in the potential impact 
of security attacks as well as a change in the fundamental motivation of some of the perpetrators. 
The growing complexity of current ITC infrastructure, as well as the disappearing boundary between personal and 
business information technology, has lead to a dramatic increase in vulnerabilities that can be exploited by potential 
attackers. Many current security technologies, such as simple password based access control and some encryption 
based security solutions, have started to become obsolete as a result of the growing ease with which they become 
compromised  (Ruighaver 2008).  While companies are forced to invest in more complex security technologies, such 
as expensive virtual private networks and intrusion prevention systems, and are struggling to keep their systems up 
to date with the latest security patches, attackers can simply buy the latest attack tools from a growing number of 
providers in this new commercial industry.  
At the same time, the potential impact of most security attacks is increasing as well. The larger reliance on ITC 
infrastructure means that a simple attack can force the shutdown of a crucial business system, or sometimes the 
whole company, even if that was not the main objective off the attack. Keeping copious amounts of sensitive data 
online or on a personal laptop often means that the impact of a confidentiality attack may result in the compromise 
of a whole database.  Such attacks may have flow-on impacts such as a significant loss of reputation, as well. 
While in the past hacking into a computer system was more or less a hobby, lately more professional groups of 
attackers have emerged. Organized crime has realized the potential financial gain that can be achieved by either 
blackmailing companies or by direct capitalization of a company’s commercial data. Activist groups have realized 
the value of publicity that can be gained by crippling a company’s web site. Organized groups of hackers in certain 
countries are actively engaged in information warfare. 
…security professionals observing the state of the “hacker” underworld have long been very concerned 
about several significant factors likely to change the face of cybercrime within organizations. The first of 
these is the shift toward a “professionalization” of computer crime … Suffice it to say, though, that more of 
the perpetrators of current computer crime are motivated by money, not bragging rights. (CSI Survey, 
2007, p16) 
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of this change in the risk landscape is the change in motivation of potential 
attackers. While the primary objective of an attack may not be to inflict maximum damage, a potential attacker is 
now rarely satisfied by compromising security alone. As a result some attacks have been prolonged creating 
progressive amounts of damage in subsequent phases of the attack. 
ASYMMETRIC TACTICS 
An important, but not the only aspect of asymmetry in risk is the asymmetry of the threat. An asymmetric threat is 
any threat that is disproportionate in its impact. In physical security the asymmetry is often in the size of the 
attackers and defenders, for instance when a small group attacks a large target. An example of such an asymmetric 
threat is that of terrorist attacks. An example of a small group attacking a large entity, in this case a country, were 
the attacks carried out on the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. The perpetrators of this asymmetric 
attack were a group of individuals with different nationalities and a common cause. About 20 of them ended up 
killing over 5,300 - the ratio being 1:250. While the asymmetric attack using a small attack force is not new, and has 
been used for many years with varying success, the problem in information security is not necessarily related to the 
size of the attacker or defender. 
In information security there are two dimensions that differentiate modern asymmetric threats from traditional 
threats. Firstly, the amount of effort and resources that has been expended by the attacking entity is small, whereas 
the corresponding impact of the attack on the defending party can be described as ‘overwhelming’. This dimension 
can be called ‘leverage’ as it signifies the ratio of the input by the attacking party compared to the output gained by 
perpetrating the particular type of threat. The second dimension is the motivation of the attacking party. Previous 
motivations of attackers on the Internet have been described as ‘bragging rights’. A recent shift has seen more 
profound reasons emerge that fall in categories such as adherence to an ideology or pursuit of financial benefit.  
This change in motivation has necessitated a consequential change in operational tactics. In this paper, the resulting 
tactics are called ‘asymmetric tactics’. Rather than using the past ‘shotgun style’ attacks where large numbers of 
Internet Protocol addresses are probed and then investigated for vulnerabilities, individual targets are pursued with a 
range of attack vectors in the hope that the objective (which is frequently to incapacitate the target organization) is 
achieved. In this way, modern asymmetric threats appear to be conducting ‘information warfare’. Also, since 
attackers are more focused on the objective of the attack, they are more willing to engage the defending party for a 
prolonged period of time, until the objective has been achieved. 
Unfortunately, from the defender’s point of view, the number of potential attackers using asymmetric tactics will 
increase dramatically because the level of competence required to carry out these attacks (which was previously 
enough of an impediment to limit the number of potential attackers and attacks) has decreased with the large-scale 
availability of sophisticated tools. While this is not a new trend at all the commercial marketing of these tools over 
the past few years has lead to their wide spread distribution. And, each time a new advancement in security is 
publicized the people that are selling these attack tools spend their time working out how to overcome these 
obstacles. Often they succeed updating their tools before many of the organizations that need to protect themselves 
have had a chance to implement these new security measures and patches. 
The long-standing mindset of many organizations, which relies on largely preventive measures to keep out potential 
attackers, is no longer cost-effective with the rise of asymmetric tactics.  A number of recent cases have 
demonstrated how asymmetric tactics can be used to simply overwhelm the defenses of organizations. In such 
scenarios, incident response teams are helpless as there are too many attack vectors and vulnerabilities to address in 
a very short time-frame.  
In this case, organizations may be better off going underground and protecting their core business function with the 
aim of surviving the storm until it is safe to re-emerge. 
All the power of a nation state cannot deal with the speed and stealth of a sophisticated and motivated team 
mounting an asymmetric attack. Hence, in the war against terrorism the emphasis has mostly been on forensic 
investigations following each terrorism attack and on the surveillance of potential attackers and early detection of 
potential new attacks. Incident response to an asymmetric attack itself only plays a minor role, but planning the 
hardening of potential targets has often lead to a significant reduction of damage of terrorism attacks. 
The use of asymmetric tactics on critical infrastructure targets creates potentially even more problems given much of 
it is controlled either by computers themselves or by human input into computers. And in particular over the past 
few decades a nexus has developed between infrastructures that have changed the security landscape within which 
modern society operates. For example, interdependence between telecommunications and electricity networks has 
created a security environment where events originating in one infrastructure can have direct impact on another and 
vice versa. (Dunlevy 2004). Hence, asymmetric information warfare tactics can, and sometimes already have been, 
successfully used against: 
 Telecommunications Networks 
 Electrical Power Systems 
 Banking and Finance 
 Water Supply Systems 
 Transportation Networks 
 Emergency Services 
All these services use Information Systems to some extent for control purposes. If control was diverted or subverted 
for any of these services it could be catastrophic for an organization or potentially even for a country. At present the 
telecommunications and electricity supplies are the most important infrastructures that keep our information systems 
working.  If either of these were to be interrupted for a lengthy period it would have catastrophic repercussions. 
While the disruption of our power supply potentially cripples our information systems, many organizations are 
currently already trying to remedy this through the use of portable workstations and the use of alternate power 
sources for their servers. This will allow their employees to continue to work as long as telecommunications are not 
interrupted. What is more difficult to protect against is the potential panic and general disruption that a successful 
attack on our power supplies might generate. This will potentially lead to an overload of communication and 
helpdesk services. 
With the disruption of our telecommunication networks again our information systems will be crippled. And 
although the process has already begun to avoid this from happening by the use of wireless communication 
infrastructures, this solution is by no means full proof. Furthermore, the use of wireless communications will enable 
other asymmetric attacks.  At each turn and with every new innovation there are new risks associated.   
ASYMMETRIC RISK. 
The growing use of asymmetric tactics is only one aspect of the ascent of asymmetric risk. The real problem is the 
increased impact that such an asymmetric attack can now have on an organization or on a country. Hence the use of 
asymmetric tactics is only one aspect of asymmetry. With so many essential functions of modern life  revolving 
around the information systems in this post-industrial age, society is subject to a whole new meaning of the term 
asymmetric risk. And the probability that such an asymmetric risk will occur is still growing. 
Therefore a critical asymmetric risk in the information systems area is defined as any risk that has a potential critical 
impact on an organizations business processes and can be caused by low capability attackers with minimal effort 
even though the organization has put a reasonable effort into avoiding or mitigating that risk.   As discussed before, 
this paper is concerned with critical asymmetric risks caused by motivated attackers who are willing to sustain 
prolonged attacks.  A few examples of where these asymmetric risks could come from may help here.  
 Disgruntled employee’s, especially Information Technology personnel, 
 Terrorists, 
 Religious Groups, 
 Political Groups. 
To illustrate the importance of asymmetric risk for current information security, a recent incident will be now 
discussed more extensively: In 2009 the Melbourne International Film Festival (MIFF) showed a documentary about 
Rebiya Kadeer called “The 10 Conditions of Love”.  The Chinese government asked the film festival organisers to 
withdraw the film, since they accused the exiled Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer of plotting Uighur riots in China 
(News.Com.Au, 2009). The festival organizers ignored this request and what followed was a sustained attack on the 
organization. It is unclear how much the Chinese government supported or encouraged this attack.  
The stages of the resulting security incident are: 
Phase 1 – Email Phase 
The first phase of the incident related to sending emails to film festival staff, to make them change their mind 
regarding the showing of the film.  The festival director reported that “the language has been vile, it is obviously a 
concerted campaign to get us because we've refused to comply with the Chinese Government's demands” 
(News.com.au, 2009). 
Phase 2 – Hacking Attack 
Hackers broke into the festival's website early yesterday (30th July), just hours after Victorian Premier John Brumby 
officially opened the 2009 festival at the Arts Centre. The hackers replaced festival information with the Chinese 
flag and anti-Kadeer slogans (The Age, 2009a) as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Hacked Screen Shot of Festival (Chinahush, 2009) 
 
The Melbourne International Arts Festival web site was also hacked and a similar message as described in Figure 1 
was left on their, web-site. The Melbourne International Arts Festival had no connection with Rebiya Kadeer and 
was perceived as being hacked by mistake (The Age, 2009b). 
Phase 3 – Denial of Service Attack 
The MIFF online ticketing experienced Denial of Service attacks from unauthorised sources. Some of these attacks 
came from offshore and some came from within Australia (Melbourne International Film Festival, 2009a). 
According to MIFF, their web site had 80,000 hits per day compared to the usual number of 10,000 hits per day 
(Techworld, 2009). The impact of the attacks was that users of the MIFF website may experience slower than 
normal response times (MIFF, 2009b). 
Phase 4 – Disruption Attack 
Organisers of the Melbourne International Film Festival were forced to shut down its online ticket sales system after 
‘Chinese hackers’ booked out all film sessions on its website When the bookings were traced to Chinese websites 
and they were identified as being fake  (News.com.au, 2009). The outcome of the attack was that MIFF online 
ticketing website was fully functional, but only existing customers could use the systems, customers had to log in 
using their existing email address and password (MIFF, 2009c). 
Instruction of how to manipulate the Melbourne International Film Festival were emailed via the Internet, the email 
provides instructions for loading tickets into ‘shopping carts’ from the festival's website, and Chinese were being 
urged to teach others how to "purchase" MIFF tickets online (Sydney Morning Herald, 2009).  
The overall attacks went from stages 1 to stage 4 occurred over a ten day period (BBC, 2009). 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE ASYMMETRIC RISK. 
The traditional approach to information security as supported by the current security standards is heavily dominated 
by the use of preventive controls and relies on the implementation of an expensive security management system to 
maintain its effectiveness. As discussed earlier, the increased complexity of both the ITC infrastructure and its 
technical security controls means that this traditional approach is not likely to be effective against an attacker using 
asymmetric tactics. Furthermore, this extensive use of preventive controls makes it easy for an attacker to evaluate 
the success of his attack and choose an alternative attack scenario if the attack is not completely successful. 
Traditional incident response philosophy has been developed towards response to a single attack and is likely to be 
overwhelmed when a motivated attacker unleashes prolonged and multi-pronged attacks. This situation is further 
complicated when the incident response team is faced by a continuing attack and cannot easily decide when the 
attack will finally end. The role of incident response in such an attack is discussed later in this section. 
Organizations that are part of a country’s critical infrastructure are expected to spend at least some resources on the 
direct defense against asymmetric attacks. Other organizations may not be able to afford extensive investments in 
direct defense, but will need to plan their response to limit the damage and ensure business continuity (Hiles 2001) if 
a prolonged asymmetric attack occurs. Business continuity will be discussed at the end of this section. 
The standard approach to limiting the damage from an attack is based on compartmentalization. This approach may 
potentially also be successful in limiting the damage from an asymmetric attack if a traditional Defense-in-Depth 
(DiD) strategy is applied. The initial aim of Defense-in-Depth is to delay an attacker while he is concentrating on 
your first defensive line, so you can deploy defensive countermeasures to protect your next line of defense. Such 
defensive countermeasures can consist of a complete isolation of the compartment that is under attack (as in a 
perimeter network firewall) or they can be more subtle and advanced. 
It is important to realize that a response to an asymmetric attack needs to be within the timeframe of the attacker. If 
an attacker has breached one compartment, then there must be a response before resources in the compromised 
compartment can be used to attack another compartment. That means that in most cases some automated form of 
response is needed. As such an automated response will in general cause some damage (e.g. isolation is a form of 
Denial of Service) it is important that these responses are well planned and approved at the highest level. 
To enable an effective response, it is important that surveillance is increased in other compartments when the initial 
attack is detected. While an attacker is able to focus his attack on a few assets, the defender will need to protect all 
assets. The earlier the defender recognizes whether asymmetric tactics are being used, and which compartments are 
in danger of being compromised, the more effective the response will be. 
A very advanced and potentially extremely effective strategy to augment Defense-in-Depth is the use of deception. 
If it is detected that an attacker is using asymmetric tactics, it becomes crucial to deny the attacker access to any 
feedback on the success of the attack. Deception, such as redirection of the attack to a honeypot, can be used to 
mislead and confuse the attacker. Deception is still an underused strategy, it is important that new research in 
deception as a countermeasure is encouraged to combat the ascent of asymmetric risk.    
Incident response and business continuity are traditionally not closely coupled. The increased probability of extreme 
asymmetric risks that can have a dramatic impact on critical business processes will mean that  more emphasis is 
needed on business continuity during incident response (because of the potential of extreme impact). At the same 
time, standard business continuity plans such as moving from a primary site to a secondary site, are not necessarily 
effective in this situation especially if the attack is aimed at an Internet Protocol address rather than a physical 
location. So new business continuity plans will need to be developed to ensure core critical business processes can 
still continue. Planning the diversification of critical business processes before such an attack takes place can greatly 
assist an effective response to a prolonged asymmetric attack, allowing some business processes to go 
“underground”.  
CONCLUSION 
The continued deterioration of the risk landscape for Information Technology and Communication infrastructures, 
and the increased reliance of organizations on their ITC infrastructure, has lead to an increased likelihood of extreme 
asymmetric risks impacting on an organization’s critical business processes. Organizations can no longer safely 
ignore or accept these risks and will need to start planning strategies to reduce the impact when these asymmetric 
risks eventuate. While the strategies proposed in this paper are particularly relevant for any organization involved in 
a country’s critical infrastructure, other organizations will need to be aware that they can no longer ignore these risks 
either.  
The particular asymmetric risks discussed in this paper are difficult to defend against using current security 
approaches, even when an organization is willing to seriously invest in preventive security controls and traditional 
incident response capabilities.  For organizations facing information warfare tactics used by a motivated attacker 
several new strategies are proposed to limit damage. The need to integrate new business continuity responses in an 
organization’s incident response planning is also discussed. This paper has not been limited to particular (detailed) 
asymmetric attack scenarios, it is believed that the proposed approach to mitigate these extreme asymmetric risks 
will lead to a flexible and adaptive security posture that will increase the organization’s overall information security 
for a range of other attacks as well.   
Future research by the authors in this area is an extension of their current research in how organizations develop new 
strategies, a concept called security strategic context, to cope with their deteriorating information security. The 
authors are currently planning a focus group based research study to investigate the relationship between the 
development of new information security approaches and an organization’s culture of change. In particular, the 
authors are interested in what factors might influence the introduction of the strategies proposed in this paper. 
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